Mr Bugg
03-02-2010, 12:04 PM
It's tough to keep it to three things, but here are the biggest problems this team has had in maintaining a consistent product:
3. Trading the Torch-Bearer
The Detroit Red Wings have been able to succeed no matter the quality of the game or salary cap because they've got the best in the game to teach youngsters.
However, not every team has had an Yzerman or has a Datsyuk, and they still seem to consistently develop talent. Why is that? It's because there's a consistent chain of progression.
Here's what the Oilers looked like at center in 2003-04:
Mike York (Age 25)
Shawn Horcoff (Age 24)
Jarret Stoll (Age 21)
Adam Oates (Age 41)
And in 2005-06, the next season after the lock-out:
Shawn Horcoff (26)
Jarret Stoll (Age 23)
Mike Peca (Age 31)
Marty Reasoner (Age 28)
No Datsyuks or Fedorovs here, but there's a clear chain of progression. It's no surprise that Stoll had a career-best season in 05-06 as he was isolated by three veteran centers. The year before that, he had Oates teaching him the position.
2006-07:
Shawn Horcoff (Age 27)
Jarret Stoll (Age 24)
Marty Reasoner (Age 29)
Toby Petersen (Age 27)
Not the best year, obviously, but the plan was still there: Stoll was given greater responsibility, and while he wasn't scoring as much, he was looking like a dominant #3 prior to his concussion.
Summer 2007 was an off-season of change. Out went Reasoner, with no veteran replacement. The team was forced to enter the year like this:
Shawn Horcoff (Age 28)
Sam Gagner (Age 18)
Jarret Stoll (Age 25)
Kyle Brodziak (Age 23)
It was a minor miracle that things weren't worse. Brodziak more than covered the bet, Stoll remained a face-off demon despite having a head of scrambled eggs, and Horcoff did yeoman's work. Sam Gagner had an epic year.
Lowe should have been grateful Anaheim didn't end up with a top ten pick, and immediately sought to rectify the situation down the middle with a valuable lesson learned. But...
2008-09
Shawn Horcoff (Age 29)
Sam Gagner (Age 19)
Kyle Brodziak (Age 24)
Marc Pouliot (Age 23)
Summer 2009 comes, and out goes Brodziak for couple of late lottery tickets. Again, fine move in isolation- Brodziak wanted more than Lowe thought he was worth. A rational observer would assume Lowe obviously thought he could get the same sort of help for cheaper. And he was right- Dominic Moore and Manny Malhotra signed for pennies on the dollar. But neither ended up in Edmonton. In fact, nobody was signed.
2009-10
Shawn Horcoff (Age 30)
Sam Gagner (Age 20)
Andrew Cogliano (Age 22)
Ryan Stone (Age 24)
Beyond just ignoring an obvious need, Lowe has simply refused to provide his young centers with a stable situation in which they can develop and surprise. It's fine when Sam Gagner shows he can play the top-six role at that point- you just demote your #2. Instead, he expects surprises, and is absolutely baffled when it doesn't happen. It's like surviving a lemon parachute during a skydiving session and then going out the next day without one. By constantly trading the next-oldest in the progression, he constantly resets the development clock.
2. Drafting for Role
Olivier Roy, Toni Rajala, Linus Omark... all are players one would think a 'safe' team wouldn't touch. But it's tough not argue the team fell into those players rather than actively pursuing them. Case-in-point: the 2009 Draft.
It is my personal philosophy that every pick in the Draft should be treated like a first round pick. The odds might be worse, sure, but it's a chance to draft a player that can potentially help your team as a first-line or first-pairing player.
However, in order to find those players, you need to draft the skillset that lends itself to a first-line player. You aren't going to get that in a Zack Stortini. You certainly as **** aren't going to get that in a Cameron Abney.
Now, Kevin Lowe might say something like "But you can't draft all 5'9 Swedes with soft hands". No, but contrary to what he might believe from his draft template, Detroit doesn't do that either. They take hockey sense no matter the package it comes in- whether it's big and fast (Johan Franzen) or small and slow (Jiri Hudler).
After all, if Franzen doesn't develop into a top-six forward, no problem. You utilize what he does bring and turn him into that 3rd liner you might not have. Hudler didn't become a first liner; that's fine, because the Wings utilized him as a soft-parade second PP guy and they won the Cup.
But if you draft for the 3rd for 4th line, you can't go up. If you believe a player's peak potential is a 4th line fighter, what can you turn them into if they don't reach develop NHL-level fighting/skating ability?
The Oilers need to shoot higher with their later picks.
1. Overpaying Up Front
The most troubling trend throughout the Lowe/Tambellini era has been the team's baffling trend of overpaying a player in the front half of a contract in the hopes the back half of the deal is 'worth it'.
Lowe essentially spelled that strategy out word-for-word when he attempted to defend the Dustin Penner offer sheet on Edmonton radio. And while he didn't come out and say it at other times, this philosophy is evident in any number of new Oiler contracts the last two years- Tom Gilbert, Shawn Horcoff, Ethan Moreau.
This is a simply staggering misunderstanding of contracts in a cap world. In the old days, yes, teams would overpay for this exact reason. A team was considered lucky if a big free agency signing didn't come out of the gate flat the next year. Now? Parity reigns supreme. If a player can't over-deliver their contract every year you probably aren't going to win.
Lowe attempted to rectify that somewhat with his 'salary grid', but this seems like another attempt to copy other organizations (2) without fully understanding why the approach works. It's like buying a Mona Lisa paint-by-numbers set and thinking you're Da Vinci.
Is it possible for a team to overcome one or two overpays? Absolutely. The best organizations in the league carry an albatross or two (see: Campbell, Brian and Theodore, Jose). That's the price of doing business with volatile assets like professional athletes. But Lowe has applied this strategy to almost every re-sign since the Cup run. That's why we're where we are today.
Conclusion
All three of the above share a common theme: underestimation. Lowe's philosophy has been that if you play it safe you'll do a good job. And he's right- throughout the pre-cap era, the Oilers were consistently a middle-road team, never great but never poor. But teams aren't built to win 8th in the West. They're built to be contenders.
Kevin Lowe doesn't understand that and it appears Steve Tambellini doesn't either.
3. Trading the Torch-Bearer
The Detroit Red Wings have been able to succeed no matter the quality of the game or salary cap because they've got the best in the game to teach youngsters.
However, not every team has had an Yzerman or has a Datsyuk, and they still seem to consistently develop talent. Why is that? It's because there's a consistent chain of progression.
Here's what the Oilers looked like at center in 2003-04:
Mike York (Age 25)
Shawn Horcoff (Age 24)
Jarret Stoll (Age 21)
Adam Oates (Age 41)
And in 2005-06, the next season after the lock-out:
Shawn Horcoff (26)
Jarret Stoll (Age 23)
Mike Peca (Age 31)
Marty Reasoner (Age 28)
No Datsyuks or Fedorovs here, but there's a clear chain of progression. It's no surprise that Stoll had a career-best season in 05-06 as he was isolated by three veteran centers. The year before that, he had Oates teaching him the position.
2006-07:
Shawn Horcoff (Age 27)
Jarret Stoll (Age 24)
Marty Reasoner (Age 29)
Toby Petersen (Age 27)
Not the best year, obviously, but the plan was still there: Stoll was given greater responsibility, and while he wasn't scoring as much, he was looking like a dominant #3 prior to his concussion.
Summer 2007 was an off-season of change. Out went Reasoner, with no veteran replacement. The team was forced to enter the year like this:
Shawn Horcoff (Age 28)
Sam Gagner (Age 18)
Jarret Stoll (Age 25)
Kyle Brodziak (Age 23)
It was a minor miracle that things weren't worse. Brodziak more than covered the bet, Stoll remained a face-off demon despite having a head of scrambled eggs, and Horcoff did yeoman's work. Sam Gagner had an epic year.
Lowe should have been grateful Anaheim didn't end up with a top ten pick, and immediately sought to rectify the situation down the middle with a valuable lesson learned. But...
2008-09
Shawn Horcoff (Age 29)
Sam Gagner (Age 19)
Kyle Brodziak (Age 24)
Marc Pouliot (Age 23)
Summer 2009 comes, and out goes Brodziak for couple of late lottery tickets. Again, fine move in isolation- Brodziak wanted more than Lowe thought he was worth. A rational observer would assume Lowe obviously thought he could get the same sort of help for cheaper. And he was right- Dominic Moore and Manny Malhotra signed for pennies on the dollar. But neither ended up in Edmonton. In fact, nobody was signed.
2009-10
Shawn Horcoff (Age 30)
Sam Gagner (Age 20)
Andrew Cogliano (Age 22)
Ryan Stone (Age 24)
Beyond just ignoring an obvious need, Lowe has simply refused to provide his young centers with a stable situation in which they can develop and surprise. It's fine when Sam Gagner shows he can play the top-six role at that point- you just demote your #2. Instead, he expects surprises, and is absolutely baffled when it doesn't happen. It's like surviving a lemon parachute during a skydiving session and then going out the next day without one. By constantly trading the next-oldest in the progression, he constantly resets the development clock.
2. Drafting for Role
Olivier Roy, Toni Rajala, Linus Omark... all are players one would think a 'safe' team wouldn't touch. But it's tough not argue the team fell into those players rather than actively pursuing them. Case-in-point: the 2009 Draft.
It is my personal philosophy that every pick in the Draft should be treated like a first round pick. The odds might be worse, sure, but it's a chance to draft a player that can potentially help your team as a first-line or first-pairing player.
However, in order to find those players, you need to draft the skillset that lends itself to a first-line player. You aren't going to get that in a Zack Stortini. You certainly as **** aren't going to get that in a Cameron Abney.
Now, Kevin Lowe might say something like "But you can't draft all 5'9 Swedes with soft hands". No, but contrary to what he might believe from his draft template, Detroit doesn't do that either. They take hockey sense no matter the package it comes in- whether it's big and fast (Johan Franzen) or small and slow (Jiri Hudler).
After all, if Franzen doesn't develop into a top-six forward, no problem. You utilize what he does bring and turn him into that 3rd liner you might not have. Hudler didn't become a first liner; that's fine, because the Wings utilized him as a soft-parade second PP guy and they won the Cup.
But if you draft for the 3rd for 4th line, you can't go up. If you believe a player's peak potential is a 4th line fighter, what can you turn them into if they don't reach develop NHL-level fighting/skating ability?
The Oilers need to shoot higher with their later picks.
1. Overpaying Up Front
The most troubling trend throughout the Lowe/Tambellini era has been the team's baffling trend of overpaying a player in the front half of a contract in the hopes the back half of the deal is 'worth it'.
Lowe essentially spelled that strategy out word-for-word when he attempted to defend the Dustin Penner offer sheet on Edmonton radio. And while he didn't come out and say it at other times, this philosophy is evident in any number of new Oiler contracts the last two years- Tom Gilbert, Shawn Horcoff, Ethan Moreau.
This is a simply staggering misunderstanding of contracts in a cap world. In the old days, yes, teams would overpay for this exact reason. A team was considered lucky if a big free agency signing didn't come out of the gate flat the next year. Now? Parity reigns supreme. If a player can't over-deliver their contract every year you probably aren't going to win.
Lowe attempted to rectify that somewhat with his 'salary grid', but this seems like another attempt to copy other organizations (2) without fully understanding why the approach works. It's like buying a Mona Lisa paint-by-numbers set and thinking you're Da Vinci.
Is it possible for a team to overcome one or two overpays? Absolutely. The best organizations in the league carry an albatross or two (see: Campbell, Brian and Theodore, Jose). That's the price of doing business with volatile assets like professional athletes. But Lowe has applied this strategy to almost every re-sign since the Cup run. That's why we're where we are today.
Conclusion
All three of the above share a common theme: underestimation. Lowe's philosophy has been that if you play it safe you'll do a good job. And he's right- throughout the pre-cap era, the Oilers were consistently a middle-road team, never great but never poor. But teams aren't built to win 8th in the West. They're built to be contenders.
Kevin Lowe doesn't understand that and it appears Steve Tambellini doesn't either.